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Abstract This article interrogates a tension at the heart of the principle of
accountability: accountability as a principle of non-impunity of public officials versus
accountability as a form of bureaucratic organisation and control. Although these
dimensions are distinguishable in the abstract, their ambiguity has led to an
expectations gap among both citizens and elites. The historical legacies of previous
policies can exacerbate this expectations gap, leading to a variety of value trade-offs,
with the potential to undermine other political values, such as political learning,
consensus-building, and citizens' rights. We present examples of the trade-offs
resulting from this expectations gap, focusing on moments of crisis in which such
trade-offs can be seen most acutely, and highlight its role as a vehicle of
global populism.
Introduction
‘There is little doubt,’ claims Matthew Flinders, ‘that the concept of account-
ability appears to be emerging as the €uber-concept of the twenty-first century’
(Flinders 2014). Similarly, Melvin Dubnick has remarked on ‘our collective
obsession’ with accountability, signalling its use as a “cultural keyword”
(Dubnick 2014). Enthusiasm for this “golden concept” (Bovens et al 2008) in
various settings has spawned a host of bureaucratic instruments and waves of
truth-seeking initiatives. Accountability appears in structural and institutional
arrangements (vertical and horizontal), in elite discourse, and in popular
demands for public officials to step down or be brought to trial. We also see
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increasing demands for bureaucratic justification, whether through continuous
assessment, auditing, or reporting requirements. More broadly, we are part of
an ‘audit society’ (Power 1997) and what Onora O’Neill describes as a ‘shift
from cultural and social approaches to compliance to widespread reliance on
formalised structures of accountability and corresponding duties of account-
ability’ (O’Neill 2014). Although the zeal for accountability does not constitute
a paradigm in the Kuhnian sense, it pervades our strategies of governance and
institutional design.2
Despite–or because of–its ubiquity, there is a great deal of scholarly and
practical disagreement about the content and scope of the principle of
accountability (Mulgan 2000; Behn 2001; Bovens 2010). Competing aims,
‘multiple, diverse, and often conflicting expectations’ (Dubnick and Romzek
1993), and value trade-offs plague the concrete attempts to instantiate
accountability and are especially troubling in moments of crisis. Scholars
have identified many of these trade-offs and suggest the need for increased
conceptual differentiation and specification. Bovens (2010) maps this scholar-
ship by calling attention to the different approaches taken to accountability
as a normative value (virtue) and as a mechanism (an instrument or policy).
Our argument takes this conceptual confusion as a starting point and asks a
further set of questions. What are the empirical consequences of conceptual
ambiguity? What happens when actors with different conceptions of account-
ability address the same crisis? How are these distinct understandings
entangled in their implementation? Should societies punish those responsible
for financial or human rights crises (horizontal accountability) or should they
focus instead on designing mechanisms and institutions to mitigate future
crises (vertical accountability)? In practice, competing conceptions of account-
ability (as manifest in various tools and policies) collide and interact. We
argue that while there is an important analytical distinction to be made
between accountability as a virtuous principle of non-impunity and as a set
of (fundamentally) bureaucratic systems of instruments, in practice, these dis-
crete elements overlap.
In this exploratory argument, we suggest three potential value trade-offs
that result from the collision of multiple, competing aims of accountability
tools and strategies and describe some of their unintended consequences.
Because tensions are most acute in times of emergency, we offer examples of
efforts to pursue accountability following moments of crisis (economic, polit-
ical and human rights). Although further and more precise empirical work
remains to be done, considering how competing concepts interact will enrich
the development of analytic frameworks for the resolution of conflicts along
the lines set out by, inter alia, Bovens (2010); Vermeule (2007); and Gerson and
Stephenson (2014).
In what follows, we map the concept of accountability, focusing on a subset
of the literature that outlines its attendant value trade-offs and unintended
consequences. Rather than creating a new typology to add to the many (useful)
existing ones, we focus on one fundamental tension at the heart of the concept
as it is used in comparative governance: the distinction between accountability
as the principle of the non-impunity of high office and accountability as a mode of
bureaucratic organisation and control. We then discuss how multiple understand-
ings of accountability and past accountability policies give rise to this tension
2 Nadia Hilliard et al
in practice. We take an exploratory look at three moments when the value
trade-offs resulting from an overly broad popular discourse of accountability
were constrained by the expectations devolving from previous policies and
strategies. We look specifically at moments of crisis because in crises and in
their direct aftermath, questions of institutional design become the most press-
ing, and value trade-offs have the most at stake.
Accountability: unpacking an €Uber-concept
At its most basic, accountability refers to a relationship of account-giving
between two or more actors. In comparative governance, the key relationships
of accountability are between citizen and government, between the different
branches of government, and between the civil service and elected officials.
Accountability is maintained through a variety of structural arrangements,
such as separation of powers or elections. For instance, different arrangements
arise from variations in executive format, determining, for example, whether a
president or cabinet is politically accountable to the parliament. But in each
case, variation in the structure of the relationship is designed to limit the scope
of each actor’s decision-making power according to a constitutionally defined
role and to protect citizens’ capacity to remove those incumbents from office
whose performance is deemed inadequate. In practice, public accountability is
maintained through a vast array of mechanisms beyond elections and struc-
tural arrangements, including standards and auditing practices in bureaucratic
settings and prosecutions and truth commissions in times of crisis.
There have been numerous scholarly attempts to map the concept of
accountability. Typologies proliferate, distinguishing, for instance, between
political, legal, professional, social, and administrative accountability (Bovens
2007; see also Dubnick and Romzek 1993 for a similar typology). Lindberg, in
a review of the literature, counts over 100 subtypes and variants (Lindberg
2013, 3). Amongst the many typologies used to disaggregate the concept, we
find two recurring metaphors. The first is a spatial metaphor, a distinction
between horizontal mechanisms (administrative instruments, such as audits and
inspections, and other institutions providing checks on power, such as high
courts, opposition parties, or central banks) and vertical mechanisms (electoral
or structural arrangements making representatives accountable to citizens)
(Diamond 2004). The second metaphor is temporal; it distinguishes between
punitive (retrospective or “post-factum” mechanisms, such as trials, investiga-
tions, and consequent sanctions) and preventative (prospective or “pre-factum”
tools, ranging from routine audits and inspections to performance measures
and reporting) modes of accountability. In practice, most contemporary public
accountability instruments are horizontal and prospective and have evolved
alongside the growth of the post-Second World War administrative state. They
are used to ensure the appropriate behaviour and performance of bureaucrats
and other public officials in liberal democracies, and they complement sanc-
tion-based mechanisms, such as investigations following a scandal.
Although both metaphors fall under the rubric of accountability, they
reflect two very different logics: accountability as a principle of the non-
impunity of high office vs. accountability as a mode of bureaucratic organisa-
tion with a particular aim (usually efficiency and improved performance). This
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distinction becomes clearer when we look at a multiplicity of political settings.
In the sphere of Transitional Justice (TJ), referring to post-crisis settings dealing
with the aftermath of human rights abuses, the underlying values are peace,
justice and reconciliation rather than efficiency. In this case, accountability
means “an explicit acknowledgement by the state that grave human rights viola-
tions have taken place and that the state was involved or responsible for them”
and includes “the recovery and diffusion of truth, criminal prosecution, repara-
tions, and efforts to guarantee non-repetition” (Skaar et al 2016, 33). As noted by
TJ scholar Ruti Teitel, “Punishment dominates our understandings of transi-
tional justice [as] emblematic of accountability” (Teitel, quoted in Skaar et al
2015, 30). In contrast, in administrative settings, such as public bureaucracies, a
form of bureaucratic organisation aims at increased efficiency and maximised
performance. Accountability might also seek to minimise misconduct, but the
goal of efficiency is still the primary underlying value. Rather than prosecutions,
the instruments designed to enhance accountability in administrative settings
include audits, standards, and performance benchmarks.
While the two meanings are eminently distinguishable in theory and are
treated separately by scholars (Bovens 2010), in practice, they can be elided
through the solutions designed to prevent future abuse. For instance, following
a financial crisis, the gross misdeeds of bankers or public officials might be
punished through prosecutions. But the state might also address these
breaches of accountability by establishing new regulatory regimes and trans-
parency frameworks–in other words, new modes of bureaucratic control and
organisation–to prevent future abuses. These policy responses reflect, at once,
a desire for retribution and justice and for learning and reform. In the best sit-
uations, these diverse goals dovetail. At other times, however, they conflict.
Numerous scholars have documented the value trade-offs between account-
ability and competing values. Vermeule (2007), for instance, notes a tension
between accountability’s sibling values of transparency and deliberation when
accountability is pursued. Similarly, Romzek and Dubnick (1987) call attention
to competing types of public accountability, including bureaucratic, legal, pro-
fessional, and political, and point to the conflicting imperatives of each type
for the central actors. Bovens (2010) takes a broader view and maps the funda-
mental tension between accountability as a principle (virtue) and as a mechan-
ism (set of instruments) and urges scholars to refine this family of concepts
and associated frameworks for more precise analysis.
Specific sub-disciplines have studied the trade-offs inherent in particular
institutional and historical settings. For instance, the trade-offs associated with
accountability following human rights crises have been widely debated, espe-
cially through the ‘peace versus justice’ debate (see, inter alia, Snyder and
Vinjamuri 2004). Likewise, public administration scholars have documented
many value conflicts in bureaucratic settings. Much ink has been spilt describing
the red tape and inefficiency that accompany administrative accountability
mechanisms, leading to a slew of terms, such as ‘bureaupathology’ or ‘multiple
accountability disorder (MAD)’ (Koppell 2005; Giblin 1981), with scholars noting
the competing pressures of multiple, overlapping demands (Romzek and
Dubnick 1987). A number of scholars, including Hood (2010), Hood and Lodge
(2006), and Perry and Hondeghem (2008), have explored the potential trade-off
between retrospective accountability (aiming at punishment) and prospective
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accountability (aiming at increasing bureaucratic performance and efficiency)
but have done so primarily within the context of public bureaucracies. The ‘new
public service bargain’ (Hood and Lodge 2006), an accountability strategy using
market mechanisms to alter the incentive structure and performance of public
sector workers, aims to achieve ‘continuously higher levels of productivity, ser-
vice orientation and accountability’ (Perry and Hondeghem 2008, 1). Whilst the
literature on public management informs our understanding of the internal
dynamics of public sector bureaucracies in recent decades, it does not address
the trade-offs arising from the more fundamental tension between the principle
of non-impunity and the practice of bureaucratic (re)-organisation and control.
Kamuf (2007), articulating the perspective of critical accounting studies,
introduces the concept of ‘accounterability as a counter-institution of resistance
to the irreducible logic of accountability’ (2007, 253). Her critique of account-
ability targets the tendency of accountability norms to depend on quantifica-
tion, and quantified modes of verification, for their realisation. This
assessment–and the wider critical movement–indeed makes a powerful critique
of the instruments of accountability commonly used as mechanisms of bureau-
cratic organisation and control. Its force is less trenchant when applied to the
political forms of accountability demanded after crises, moments when discre-
tion (and narrative) can be co-opted for political ends. Gerson and Stephenson
(2014) use the term ‘over-accountability’ to describe the ‘dark side of account-
ability’ and its distortions, suggesting that ‘far from being anomalies, over-
accountability problems may well be quite common’ (2014, 187). Broadly,
Gerson and Stephenson dissect the structure of discretion by considering
which concerns and motivations might lead an agent to exercise discretion
against citizens’ best interests. Their focus on the psychological consequences
of institutional structure provides a valuable mapping of the perverse incen-
tives that can emerge from accountability arrangements in routine political
time (such as non-crisis, or pre-crisis time). However, their highly useful typ-
ology of over-accountability problems centres only on the incentives from
immediate political circumstances, and not from historical legacies that might
also shape the meaning and desirability of a given action.
What joins these two distinct principles of accountability is the way public
expectations can mediate the success of any given tool of accountability. Whether
or not accountability arrangements work depends significantly on the expectations
of all actors. These expectations–what Romzek calls the “expectations context of
accountability” (Romzek 1996)–are influenced by the competing, ambiguous con-
ceptions of accountability outlined above and by the legacies of past approaches to
accountability. In what follows, we explore the trade-offs and tensions resulting
from this expectations gap in three post-crisis situations.
The expectations gap: ambiguity and policy legacies
The conceptual ambiguity outlined above can lead to unrealistic expectations
of what a given policy of accountability can achieve. For instance, a highly vis-
ible prosecution might address the principle of non-impunity, while a less vis-
ible regulatory reform might impose bureaucratic control with the aim of
preventing future abuse. These provoke very different effects and respond to
very different public desires (e.g. retribution rather than prevention).
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Moreover, both administrative and punitive (retrospective) tools are used
towards multiple ends: improved performance, justice, democratic integrity,
and political learning. From the perspective of institutional design, realising all
of these goals with a single institution, policy, or strategy of accountability is
not always possible. More broadly, organisations committed to promoting
accountability measures in public life do so in the belief that they bring legit-
imacy to and trust in state institutions. Yet these expectations are not always
met. The expectations gap thus stems, in part, from the different meanings
attached to ‘accountability’ by citizens and public officials.
A crucial omission of the literature is a consideration of how these very dif-
ferent meanings and their instruments interact and overlap. David Mathews’s
‘tentative hypothesis is that institutions think of accountability in informational
terms while citizens think in relational terms’ (Mathews 2011). Although we
see widespread demands from angry citizens for ‘accountability’ in the form of
sanctions following crises or scandals, this does not sit well with the institu-
tional or administrative solutions proposed by governments to prevent future
crises. Popular expectations also play a role in determining whether a given
accountability policy is deemed successful and contributes to a restoration of
trust in the government.
The legacies of past accountability arrangements and policies can influence
elite expectations of the range of available policies and public expectations of
their effects. In his account of democracy-enhancing mechanisms, Vermeule
(2007) advocates a focus on ‘institutional design writ small’: rather than rede-
signing institutions whole scale, such as altering executive format or the struc-
ture of federalism to increase accountability, he advocates a small-scale design
approach to permit adaptive tinkering to existing rules and institutions based
on the particular contingencies of the society. To be feasible and effective,
reforms must consider the decisions of previous actors. Though his argument
focuses on major institutional decisions, such as a country’s basic constitutional
features, his insight can be extended to crisis situations. When choosing a pol-
icy of accountability, elites must make choices based on the existing legal and
regulatory frameworks. The viability of any reform must be viewed in light of
past and existing arrangements’ success or failure because the public’s percep-
tions and expectations will depend, in part, on the historical record. The litera-
ture evaluating the effects of retrospective accountability policies in times of
transition suggests prosecutions can easily be politicised, undermining political
stability and precluding any real sense of justice; in fact, truth commissions
might intensify existing resentments. The historical memory of previously
politicised prosecutions, or even ideologically motivated regulatory reforms,
can taint the public’s perception of the effectiveness and desirability of a given
policy. Consequently, public expectations are not static. They change over time
in response to past state actions and the perceived fairness of punishment (see
Capoccia and Pop-Eleches 2016, for an account of the importance of fairness
perception on the efficacy of TJ tools of accountability).
Figure 1 gives a dynamic picture of how the different approaches to
accountability (both normative and empirical) interact over time. Crises occur
in the context of a framework of laws and bureaucratic structures set up after
previous crises. For instance, the Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 in the United
States resulted in a comprehensive regulatory framework to separate
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commercial from investment banking following the stock market crash of 1929.
Although the framework protected the international financial system for deca-
des, it evolved over time to become all but non-existent. As a hollowed-out
framework, it became the regulatory backdrop to the financial crisis of 2008.
Crucially, the meaning and efficacy of this accountability framework changed
as the United States moved between periods of crisis and ‘normalcy’ and also
conditioned the perception of what kind of response to the 2008 crisis would
be sufficient and effective.
The left side of the graph in Figure 1 highlights the accountability strategies
of non-crisis periods; these are characterised by a prospective accountability
framework and dominated by bureaucratic actors. The right side shows how
demands for retrospective accountability and effective reform (based on learn-
ing from past policy failures) intensify following a crisis or at a critical juncture
but unfold in the context of certain moral and social expectations. The dialect-
ical relationship between these phases and types of mechanisms is circular,
with crises recurring over time. What is important here is how the two distinct
principles of non-impunity and bureaucratic organisation, though eminently
distinguishable in theory, merge in practice.
Note that in this article, we do not review the balance sheet of specific insti-
tutional mechanisms’ effects on democratic outcomes. Important work in this
area has been, and continues to be done, in the field of public administration,
especially by members of the Utrecht School (Bovens et al 2008) and by
Figure 1. Patterns of accountability and reform in relation to crises.
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scholars in the field of Transitional Justice (e.g., Skaar et al 2016). Instead, in
what follows, we focus on three value tensions that surface alongside demands
for accountability at critical political and economic junctures. More precisely,
we highlight the conflict between sanctions and learning, justice and rights,
and populism and stability as potential conflicts arising from the pursuit of
accountability. The first (sanctions versus learning) demonstrates a case of
competing goals. The second (justice versus rights) is emblematic of the under-
lying value conflicts that can arise. The third (populist calls for accountability
versus stability) occurs when the discourse of accountability is used for imme-
diate political gain. Our case study approach allows us to show that the deci-
sions made during transitions and major crises or at critical junctures often
have a long-term impact on the quality of democratic institutions (Bermeo
1992; Diamond 1999; Przeworski 1991), respect for the rule of law (O'Donnell
2004), and human rights (Sikkink 2011; Olsen et al 2010).
Accountability through sanctions vs. accountability for learning and reform
In moments of crisis, citizens and elites alike call for punitive sanctions of
those deemed responsible. Yet the instruments of accountability to which elites
turn are more often tied to processes of reform and learning than to punish-
ment. This tendency has intensified with the neoliberal management reforms
associated with New Public Management. It is reflected both in the use of such
technologies as performance indicators and regular audits, as well as in the
discourse surrounding their development and adoption. For instance, in the
‘Reinventing Government’ rubric of the 1990s, the role of US federal inspectors
general (IGs) was redefined. From punitive ‘gotcha’ figures, IGs evolved into
‘in-house management consultants’ (Hilliard 2017). This and similar de facto
expansions of the meaning and uses of accountability have created a tension
between expectations of accountability as a sanction and accountability as a
source of learning and reform.
Learning from the past is a critical element in modern democracies, espe-
cially in times of crisis or during transition (Bermeo 1992). The comparative
experience of a number of European countries suggests understanding how
institutions failed in the past is seen, at least by some political elites, as neces-
sary to craft effective reforms. Unfortunately, the call for retributive sanctions
by political parties playing a ‘blame game’ as a strategy to deflect public scru-
tiny, or by the general populace looking for a scapegoat, can clash with genu-
ine attempts to learn, deliberate, and reform. In turn, this impedes the capacity
of governments to generate a sustainable post-crisis stability (Hood 2010).
Many elites want to learn from the past to avoid a return to crisis conditions.
They want to know how the relevant institutions failed to prevent the disaster
and how to avoid a similar one in the future. In addition to learning, however,
there can be a concomitant punitive function. The Pecora Commission, set up
in the United States to identify the causes of the 1929 Wall Street Crash, not
only shed light on the causes and made suggestions for innovative institutional
change, but also led to high profile resignations (Pecora 1968). Acting on the
Commission’s findings, the authors of the Glass-Steagall Act (mentioned
above) separated commercial from investment banking, protecting democracies
from another global financial crisis for several decades. An emphasis on
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performance (in this case, both personal and institutional) need not necessarily
be in conflict with the quality of democracy, and in the best of times, these
aims dovetail.
But not always. Iceland’s post-financial crisis experience shows the tensions
that may arise between retrospective accountability policies and a political
desire to learn from the past. In October 2008, Iceland’s three major banks col-
lapsed within a week, leading to the third largest corporate bankruptcy on
record. Reykjavik experienced an unprecedented wave of popular protest; pub-
lic pressure on politicians to explain the causes of the crisis was one of the first
reactions. Accordingly, a truth commission, the Special Investigative
Commission (SIC), was established to document the reasons for the meltdown
(Kovras et al 2017). To carry out its demanding task, the SIC was given rein-
forced investigative powers, including but not limited to subpoenaing wit-
nesses, seizing evidence, and searching premises. Obstructing its investigation
was punishable by up to two years’ imprisonment (ibid). It is worth noting
that the Commission was geared toward uncovering the causes of the crisis
and offering recommendations for reform, not scoring political points or prose-
cuting individuals. Moreover, setting up the SIC was the decision of the
incumbent party, largely seen as responsible for the crisis, and was supported
by cross-party consensus. Finally, Iceland did not have a history of politicised
prosecutions. All of these factors mattered tremendously for the legitimacy of
the inquiry and its ability to restore trust.
It was decided that the proceedings would take place behind closed doors,
and witnesses were given guarantees that their statements could not be used
against them before any court of law. These incentives were to ensure partici-
pants felt comfortable enough to share their knowledge and to ‘avoid
rehearsed, standardized responses that are designed for media headlines and
shifting responsibility on to others’ (Kovras et al 2017). When the microphones
were turned off, and the official interview was over, witnesses were encour-
aged to talk ‘off the record’ to help commissioners understand the logic of
their decisions. In short, the structure of the investigation separated partisan
and punitive motives from the learning process. As Iceland did not have a
prior history of politicised prosecutions, the strategy was not tainted by past
failures and thus represented a powerful option for elites.
Iceland’s experience suggests an important dichotomy. On the one hand,
calls for accountability could evolve into healthy new administrative practices,
strong institutions, and even novel technologies enabling prospective gains for
the entire society, as well as better governance, with minimum clashes with
other priorities and core democratic values. On the other hand, accountability
could degenerate into a discourse serving partisan interests, retrospective
thinking, and electorally appealing yet populist formulas, as suggested by
recent examples in the US and India, and by the Brexit referendum campaign
(Adeney 2015; Richards and Smith 2017). The promise of accountability could
be a particularly powerful tool in majoritarian elections and referendums aim-
ing to promote fast change, yet as these examples suggest, the results could
very quickly fall short of expectations.
Taking into account the wider discursive setting allows us to consider a fur-
ther challenge to fostering public accountability: overcoming the tension between
individual and collective responsibility. For a growing body of scholarship,
The perils of accountability after crisis 9
financial crises are not necessarily caused by criminal activities punishable by
law but can be traced to an entrenched culture of ‘excessive risk taking’ fostered
by financial institutions and banks (Laeven and Levine 2009). In such contexts, it
is difficult to prosecute those responsible, and it can be counter-productive if
prosecutions impede attempts to reform regulations. Prosecutions and trials are
highly visible, public, and adversarial procedures; documenting the past in order
to learn often requires protection for participants.
Crafting reform policies frequently involves offering incentives to those
who possess valuable information, including provisions for immunity, ano-
nymity, and a depoliticised environment. Yet this is at odds with certain val-
ues and processes that accompany calls for accountability, such as
transparency, visibility, the identification of perpetrators, and the initiation of
criminal action. For instance, trials can, in theory, shed light on the past, but in
criminal proceedings, the scope of criminal accountability is very specific and
proves the guilt or innocence only of the individual(s) on trial. As such, trials
explore individuals’ actions (or omissions), not broader institutional or regula-
tory failures. Wider cultures of corruption constituting the moral and social
setting for individual misdeeds are elided when these common accountability
strategies are used, heightening the tension between individual and collective
responsibility. Equally important, this type of post-factum accountability is
adversarial and provokes defensive responses. Individuals with valuable
knowledge frame their testimonies to minimise the prospect of punishment,
side-lining information not directly related to the proceedings but potentially
useful for broader learning purposes.
If political elites pursue punitive accountability following crises to accom-
modate public calls for justice, they will render the prospect of political learn-
ing and effective reform less feasible. The ensuing tension will create a
challenge for them: how can they balance the competing political goals of just-
ice and reform? In Iceland, bankers and politicians were prosecuted, but only
after the publication of SIC’s report on the broader institutional and regulatory
failures behind the collapse; thus, their personal misdeeds were contextualised
in a wider political narrative. Since 2011, more than 57 individuals have been
charged, with roughly half sentenced to serve time in prison. It would have
been extremely difficult to convince the same number of individuals to share
the same quality of information with the commission had the prosecutions
occurred simultaneously. This example suggests an important lesson from the
case of Iceland: a broader consensus based on shared lessons has to precede
accountability practices rather than the other way around.
Accountability as justice vs. accountability as rights
Since the Second World War, a discourse of accountability has pervaded post-
crisis reckoning and transitions to democracy, and it is increasingly codified in
international frameworks and standards. The plethora of instruments and
processes designed to bring accountability to societies in transition forms the
backbone of transitional justice (TJ). The transitional justice literature explores
the impact of human rights prosecutions in times of transition on the quality
of the emerging democracy, including respect for human rights and the rule of
law (Sikkink 2011; Olsen et al 2010). As a growing number of repressive
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leaders and warlords end up in jail, a ‘justice cascade’ has gained momentum
in the policymaking world, sparking the interest of academics (Sikkink 2011).
Most major international organisations and think-tanks have added criminal
trials to the toolkit of post-conflict democratisation (United Nations 2006).
In a nutshell, most proponents of transitional justice see a positive relation-
ship between policies of accountability and the democratisation process.
Punishing perpetrators or documenting human rights violations not only
addresses victims’ rights but also has the potential to restore trust between state
and society. Accountability policies, in theory, should be transparent, depoliti-
cised, and regulated by rules set in law. When politics fails to settle a crisis, the
law is brought in as a seemingly impartial arbiter to redress victims’ legal rights.
Still, in transitional settings, victims often have different priorities and con-
flicting sets of rights (Kovras 2017; Hall et al 2017). Moreover, the legacy of
past policies can shape victims’ preferences. They do not always prefer
‘accountability’ as such, at least not in the punitive sense of the term. For
instance, when the relatives of those who disappeared during a period of vio-
lence or state repression face the choice of prosecuting those responsible for
the abduction or providing amnesties in exchange for learning about their
loved ones’ whereabouts, they do not necessarily prefer the former. Hence, the
pursuit of justice under the rubric of accountability may directly conflict with
citizens’ preferences. In practice, the outcomes of accountability-driven actions
are often co-opted for political use; the connection of politics and legalism can
be tenuous. Many societies faced with post-2008 financial crises had earlier
experienced violent conflict leading to large-scale violations of human rights
and attendant attempts at restorative justice.
The post-conflict experience of Cyprus is especially revelatory. During two
waves of violence (1963–1974), approximately 2,000 persons went missing from
Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. The Committee on Missing
Persons (CMP), a UN-led humanitarian committee set up in 1981 to find the
missing, remained a dead letter for years while relatives brought a number of
cases to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). In 2005, in an unex-
pected move, the leaders of the two communities decided to resume the activ-
ities of the CMP and since then, it has become a tremendously successful bi-
communal project, exhuming more than half of the 2,000 missing persons and
identifying most of them, allowing thousands of families to start the healing
process.1 Although explaining this policy change is beyond the scope of this
article, it is worth highlighting a critical aspect of the CMP for broader
accountability studies. Because of the covert nature of the crime of the missing,
identifying victims requires eyewitnesses (often perpetrators) to come forward
and share information about gravesites. Yet revealing potentially incriminatory
evidence deters eyewitnesses from collaborating. To overcome this obstacle,
the CMP offered immunity from prosecution and ensures anonymity and con-
fidentiality (Kovras 2017). A number of countries around the world, including
Northern Ireland and Colombia, have used a similar formula to deal with vic-
tims of clandestine political violence (Dempster 2016).
1 Specifically, 1,119 victims were unearthed and 701 identified by November 2016 (CMP 2016;
Loizides 2016).
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This is often perceived as ‘impunity’ by human rights watchdogs and inter-
national advocacy networks and, therefore, as conflicting with a more abstract
commitment to accountability. In an illustrative example, Amnesty
International attacked the ‘Law and Amnesty Law’ adopted in 2005 in
Colombia to deal with the disappeared, on the grounds that it ‘fails to comply
with international standards on victims’ right to truth, justice and reparation’
(Amnesty International 2005). In fact, Human Rights Watch went so far in its
pursuit of accountability in Colombia as to oppose the negotiated settlement
during the peace referendum of 2016, siding with its extreme right-wing oppo-
nents. At the same time, the US State Department refused to issue visas to
FARC members, undermining President Santos’ plans to sign the agreement at
UN headquarters ahead of the referendum vote.2
These examples from post-conflict societies suggest the inherent tensions
between accountability and the often controversial requirements of peace proc-
esses (Loizides 2016). The Cypriot case also signals the legacy of previous uses
of prosecutions in Cyprus: they have taken place in a politicised context and
are often considered to lead to unjust outcomes (Bozkurt and Yakinthou 2012).
As noted in the Icelandic bank crisis, a broader consensus based on shared les-
sons has to precede effective accountability practices. The Cypriot case historic-
ally lacked this consensus and the institutions that foster it, demonstrating
instead a politicised context leading to unjust outcomes that further under-
mined the objectives of good governance (Bozkurt and Yakinthou 2012; Kovras
et al 2017). Unlike Iceland, the post-conflict and post-2008 financial crises often
led to conflicting partisan narratives. Interestingly, the government-appointed
fact finding committee did not meet expectations, with two out of three mem-
bers resigning in the process (Pegasiou 2017). Moreover, the auditor-general
himself not only exceeded his authorities on governance issues but also used it
to engage in discussions of the long-standing Cypriot problem of specifically
targeting the funding for pro-reconciliation activities and media.3 In such situa-
tions, contradictory decisions, politicisation and excessive over-accountability
practices divide the public and weaken the legitimacy of democratic processes
and institutions. When public expectations of prosecutions are low, the polit-
ical will to pursue them diminishes.
The examples cited above raise important political, ethical, and legal ques-
tions. For instance, what happens when a particular set of international
accountability norms clashes with another set of citizens’ rights? The experi-
ence of the families of the disappeared in the aftermath of state repression is
illustrative. On the one hand, according to the international legal framework,
states have a duty to carry out an ‘effective investigation’ and to ‘prosecute’
those responsible for the crime (International Convention for the Protection of
2 Human Rights Watch also condemned amnesty attempts in Tunisia, arguing they would
constitute a final blow to democratic transition.
3 In July 2019, a Russian-made missile launched by Syria accidentally hit the village of Vouno
in the northern part of Cyprus. Cyprus Mail become the target of the auditor general of the
Republic of Cyprus for its mistaken use of the changed (illegal) name of Tashkent in its reporting.
The Greek Cypriot inhabitants of Vouno were ethnically cleansed in 1974 while their houses were
given to Turkish Cypriot survivors of a massacre in Tochni, perpetrated by Greek Cypriot militia
and for which no accountability processes have ever been pursued. This was the case for both
Greek and Turkish Cypriot victims during the 1963-1974 era, demonstrating the selective use of
narratives and accountability practices in the island. (Cyprus Mail 2019).
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all Persons from Enforced Disappearances 2006). On the other hand, the fami-
lies have the right to ‘know the truth,’ including the right to have access to
and obtain information about the death of a loved one (see Kurt v. Turkey
1998; Cyprus v. Turkey 2001). Families have an overlapping ‘right to repar-
ation’ which includes the right to identify and bury their loved ones
(International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced
Disappearances 2006). In effect, these rights conflict with international stand-
ards of retributive accountability as supported by, for instance, Amnesty
International. The two sets of rights are mutually exclusive in this case.
The effectiveness of an exhumation policy rests on the absence of criminal
proceedings, and any effort to prosecute individuals is achieved at the expense
of forensic truth, as eyewitnesses will be understandably reluctant to continue
to share information that would incriminate them in the future. This is com-
mon knowledge within the CMP, which avoided the pitfalls of politicisation
and selective persecution in its exhumation policies taking place in the absence
of an overall political settlement. As a Turkish-Cypriot member of the CMP
stressed: ‘This project is working because grassroots people are giving us infor-
mation and if we start dealing with punishment, these people are not going to
give us any more information. It is not time to do [criminal investigations]
now’ (Personal Interview 2008).
In other words, accountability norms and what victims want frequently
clash, and despite Amnesty’s vocal support for punitive accountability, victims
may prioritise other results. Although the families in Cyprus are very familiar
with the legal instruments and have brought their cases to domestic and inter-
national courts, none, from either side of the divide, has initiated a legal pro-
ceeding. The puzzle is even more intriguing when we consider 700 families
have now identified the victims and no longer depend on the testimony of per-
petrators. They could go to court and seek punitive accountability through the
justice system. But they know that even one prosecution will bring the process
to a halt, and hundreds of other families will be left trapped in ambiguous
loss. In effect, they prioritise the right of those other families to learn the truth
about the whereabouts of their loved ones over their own right to seek legal
redress and justice.
A recent quantitative survey of victims in Bosnia turns up a similar pat-
tern (Hall et al 2017). The evidence suggests exposure to direct violence and
loss is associated with support for retributive justice measures, whilst greater
present-day interdependence with perpetrators, particularly among displaced
persons returning to their homes, is associated with support for restorative
justice measures. In Bosnia, a tough resolve approach to former war crimi-
nals, particularly in local police units, was instrumental in facilitating volun-
tary peaceful return. While accountability at some levels facilitated the peace
process, Bosnia also benefited from restorative justice initiatives aiming to
reconcile the three communities through power-sharing arrangements. In
fact, as the cases of Cyprus and Colombia suggest, improving intercommu-
nal relations following ethnic cleansing may rely on restorative justice mech-
anisms. When faced with competing values, citizens do not automatically
prioritise accountability over such things as equal opportunities or material
rewards. They may resent the burden imposed on them by an uncritical
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adoption of a very narrow set of accountability standards in the name of
justice and human rights.
Accountability as populist resource vs. accountability as source of stability
Much of the political force of accountability lies in its popular use. The very
discourse of accountability can be both a popular (often populist) resource and
a source of improved governance. Conventional wisdom assumes countries
with weak institutions and legacies of politicisation of justice are likely to mis-
use accountability processes. For example, when legal tools become partisan
tools and committees of inquiry or prosecutions are used to score political
points, the instrumental use of justice fails to bring real accountability and dis-
credits the entire judicial institution. Populism trumps stability.
Popular calls for accountability intensify at critical junctures, such as during
political transitions marking the end of a period of state repression or in the
aftermath of economic, environmental, and other disasters (Boin et al 2008).
Public demands to diagnose what went wrong and to hold those responsible
to account dominate public debates, constraining the range of policy responses
available to political elites. In theory, this process is crucial for the restoration
of trust between state and society. An over-emphasis on policies of account-
ability, however, makes negotiations among political parties adversarial, con-
frontational, and often punitive, limiting the prospect of harmonious decision-
making and precluding the consensus needed for effective reform. In times of
crisis, demagogues ride the tide of popular discontent and hijack calls for
accountability to play the blame game against opponents, further trimming
democratic legitimacy. The historical memory of such politicisation exacerbates
elites’ unwillingness to pursue such policies and negatively influences the pub-
lic’s perception of their legitimacy.
Consider the comparative experience of post-recession Europe. In the recent
economic crisis, political elites in Greece, Ireland, Cyprus and Spain had to
address growing popular pressure to find those responsible and hold them to
account. This was visible in the waves of street protests and the emergence of
pro-accountability social movements. At the same time, political elites sought a
basic consensus to legitimise fundamental policies of institutional and eco-
nomic reform. A quick economic recovery requires effectiveness and continuity
in decision-making, more achievable when supported by a broad spectrum of
political elites. Inclusivity in the decision-making process is paramount for
democracy to be legitimate and for institutional reforms to succeed.
Greece is illustrative of this tension. Because of its large public debt, with
the recession, it experienced a major economic shock and faced external eco-
nomic supervision. This was followed by a prolonged political crisis, violent
street protests, and the electoral rise of the far right (Lamprianou and Ellinas
2017). New populist political parties sprang out of grassroots mobilisation;
some had electoral success. The push for accountability in a party system
dominated by two mainstream parties–both seen as responsible for the crisis–-
became a central promise in electoral campaigns.4 The excessive focus on
4 Between 2009 and 2016, more than 120 bankers, former politicians, businessmen and civil
servants were prosecuted or convicted on charges related to the economic meltdown.
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retributive policies to address the past torpedoed any efforts to act in concert
across the political spectrum and curtailed the legitimacy of even the most
basic decisions. Although polarisation, instability and the fragmentation of the
Greek political system should also be attributed to other entrenched institu-
tional problems (including the institutionalised single-party ‘eccentric major-
itarianism’), calls for accountability precluded any form of cross-party
consensus (Kovras and Loizides 2014). In times of economic stress, effective
governance often necessitates consensus with the opposition who may have
skeletons in its closet. Threats of retrospective retribution (exposing the skele-
tons) frame political debates in a confrontational way, however, precluding
consensus. Moreover, the legacy of the past in countries dealing with the after-
math of financial crisis is telling: grassroots activists and policymakers in
Spain, Portugal, and Greece all expressed scepticism that prosecutions and par-
liamentary committees of inquiry could avoid a high level of politicisation,
thus conditioning expectations of what such an accountability strategy
might achieve.
These dilemmas are not limited to economic crises. The debate between
backward-looking accountability and forward-looking reconciliation was first
identified in the transitology literature (inter alia, O'Donnell et al 1986; Linz
and Stepan 1996). It is now commonly understood that negotiated transitions
are more likely to consolidate democracy if they are based on the inclusion of
as many parties as possible, exemplified in the all-party coalitions of Northern
Ireland following the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement (O’Leary and McGarry
2016). Bringing contentious issues into negotiations, like accountability for past
crimes, increases the risk of alienating powerful actors who have something to
hide. To avoid going to jail, they may prefer to become spoilers and derail
negotiations. For example, while the UN was brokering a peace agreement in
Northern Uganda, based on an amnesty to induce key actors to sit at the nego-
tiating table, the International Criminal Court (ICC) indicted Joseph Kony, a
local warlord. The peace talks immediately collapsed, and hostilities continued
for years, with a heavy toll on human lives (Vinjamuri 2010). As the case sug-
gests, pushing for accountability can remove the political flexibility, inclusivity,
and consensus required to support democratisation. This conclusion is sup-
ported by the Spanish and Irish cases. In Spain, the transition from Francoism
in the mid-1970s was only possible because of a broad political consensus to
support democracy and the cautious decision to skip accountability (Linz and
Stepan 1996). In Northern Ireland, a decision to avoid dealing with the past set
the stage for a non-violent transition to inclusive power-sharing and led to an
unprecedented period of democracy, peace, stability, respect for human rights
and prosperity (McEvoy and Mallinder 2012).
We should also note that the confluence of these factors could open the
door to populist leaders. The October 2018 elections in Brazil bear this out;
here, economic hardship, (alleged) corruption scandals, and lack of govern-
ment accountability paved the way for an anti-system message (Spektor 2018).
Branded by the international media as the ‘Brazilian Trump,’ Jair Bolsonaro
was quick to fit the bill with a polarising populism fiercely opposing gender
equality, migration and environmental protections for the Amazon basin. His
opponent and former leader Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was imprisoned during
the presidential campaign on alleged corruption scandals and was prevented
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from running for president despite his lead in the polls. He was subsequently
described by international left activists as the ‘world’s most prominent political
prisoner’ although his story received very little international attention until the
catastrophic August 2019 Amazon forest fires.5 Bolsonaro’s instrumentalisation
of the principle of non-impunity of high office demonstrates an important mechan-
ism in the rise of populism and constitutes an important warning against legal
mechanisms sanctioning public officials from elections. Courts prevented Lula
himself from running as a candidate. This example demonstrates the way the
discourse and practices of accountability surrounding a corruption scandal can
be used instrumentally to weaken genuine accountability.
Conclusion
As Dubnick and Frederickson observe, “We commonly equate democracy with
accountable governance,” but the whole-hearted pursuit of accountability may
lead to conflicts and value trade-offs (Dubnick and Frederickson 2011). The inev-
itable gap between the promise and the reality of accountability, stemming from
its conceptual ambiguity both in the abstract and in practical application, can
undermine any beneficial effects accountability may have on democracy.
Moreover, the historical legacy of failed policies–whether bureaucratic-regula-
tory or prosecutorial–further influences the range of possible strategies available
to elites, and affects the public’s perception of their efficacy and legitimacy.
Although many of the goals of accountability are indispensable to the
health of democracy, their pursuit often leads to conflicts and trade-offs, with
attendant moral and pragmatic disadvantages. The potential consequences of
these conflicts are many, but can often be addressed through consensus politics
and institutional design. The trade-off between sanctions and learning can lead
to missed reform opportunities, and choosing one value over the other can set
precedents for the efficacy of future attempts to govern after crisis. Similarly,
pursuing justice for the perpetrators of wrongdoing can preclude the realisa-
tion of victims’ parallel rights (or simply preferences). The choice of which
value to pursue will condition citizens’ expectations of the legitimacy and
effectiveness of such policies in future crises. Finally, the appropriation of
accountability by populists can curtail the legitimacy of a democracy in crisis
and hinder the development of both representative and deliberative
approaches to democratic decision-making. This can undermine future
attempts to restore accountability by delegitimizing the strategies used to pur-
sue it. Although not all cases will present such clear-cut value trade-offs, our
stylised examples illustrate the potential perils of decision-making after crisis.
These trade-offs pose an immediate problem of institutional design. Yet the
solution to this problem cannot be derived from a set of attributes or princi-
ples; even exquisitely designed institutions can be subverted by actors seeking
multiple, incompatible goals. Our argument, which highlights the effects of
both conceptual ambiguity and policy legacies on expectations of accountabil-
ity policies, complements existing literature on the ‘golden concept’ of account-
ability. Any strategy undertaken by policy makers following crisis must take
5 McEvoy, John, “Jeremy Corbyn Joins International Outcry to Free Brazilian Political
Prisoner Lula da Silva,” The Canary, 29 July 2019.
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into account the concrete conceptions and expectations of accountability that
result from the historical legacy of past approaches to accountability and the
conceptions of multiple actors. The primary design challenge, therefore, is to
identify the tensions of accountability in each crisis, and to minimise the wide
range of unintended consequences that inevitably issue from each
experimentation.
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